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CONTRACTS - SUBROGATION - PARTIAL SUBROGATION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES - Plaintiff, an incorporated home for the
aged, provided all essential medical care to one of its residents under the
provisions of a life-care contract between it and the resident. On the basis
of a contract clause which purported to subrogate plaintiff to the right of
the resident to recover medical expenses caused by the negligence of third
parties, plaintiff brought an action to recover certain medical expenses
incurred from the party who was allegedly responsible for the injuries and
death of the resident. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action and dismissed the case. On appeal to
the California Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The statutory prohibition
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against the assignment of personal injury claimst precluded the transfer of
claims for medical expenses by subrogation. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54
Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960).
A right of subrogation was denied in the principal case because, like
assignment, subrogation would transfer a cause of action for personal injuries to a third party; the policy barring assignment was considered to
apply to subrogation also.2 The common law rule barred the assignment
of personal injury claims because these claims did not survive the death
of the wrongdoer or injured party, a characteristic which was regarded as
essential to transferable property rights.s This rule of nontransferability
frustrated early attempts of life insurers to obtain subrogation against a
negligent third party who caused the death of one of its policyholders.4
Even in states which have provided for the survival of a personal injury
action, many courts would narrowly construe such a statute which abrogates
the common law and thus would require an express act of the legislature to
make such actions assignable.11 However, the retention of this common-law
rule should not be based solely on the technical rules of statutory construction. It would seem more persuasive to bar the assignment of personal
injury claims because of the need to protect an injured party confronted
with the difficulty of determining a fair consideration for transferring his
unliquidated claim for damages. Allowing the unrestricted transfer of personal injury claims might open the door for assignees to attempt to profit
at the expense of necessitous injured parties through champertous practices.6
However, in the case of partial subrogation of the injured party's cause of
CIV. CoDE § 956.
Principal case at 382. But cf. General Acr.., Fire & Life Assur. Co. v. Zerbe Constr.
Co., 269 N.Y. 227, 199 N.E. 89 (1935) (workmen's compensation insurer equitably entitled
to subrogation); United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) (insurer
entitled to subrogation when insured was injured by a government employee).
8 4 CORBIN, CoNTRACI'S § 857 (1951). For collected cases, see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500
(1955).
-i Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New
York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1856). Early attempts at subrogation under health and
accident insurance policies were denied on the ground that these were not indemnity
contracts. See Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633
(1908), where the court held that in the absence of a contractual stipulation that the
insurer was to be regarded as an indemnitor, the insured had an absolute right to the
proceeds of the policy. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 72
S.W. 621 (1902), a[J'd, 96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W. 168 (1903), where the court held that the
policy was not one of indemnity since the insurer did not undertake to be responsible
for the entire loss suffered by the insured.
II There is a split of authority whether a survival statute also operates to make a
cause of action assignable. Compare Grand Rapids & I. R.R. v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge,
161 Mich. 181, 126 N.W. 56 (1910) (survival statute did make action assignable), with
Betltlehem Fabricators v. H. D. Watts Co., 286 Mass. 556, 190 N.E. 828 (1934) (survival statute did not make action assignable). For collected cases, see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d
500 (1955).
6 See CORBIN, CoNTRACI'S §§ 1422, 1427 (1950).
1 CAL.

2
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action in the amount of medical expenses paid for him, the right transferred
to the subrogee is valued by the specific payments he has made for the
benefit of the injured party.7 Therefore, since the subrogee's recovery is
restricted to reimbursement for the medical expense he has actually incurred, champertous practices should not develop.
One compelling reason for allowing recovery on the subrogated portion
of the cause of action is suggested by the fact that the majority of states
allow the injured party to recover his medical expenses from the negligent
party even though they have been paid by a collateral source such as a
medical insurer.8 This is done to prevent the negligent party from benefiting from a contract made by or for the benefit of the injured party.o
However, this rule enables the injured party to profit through the double
payment of medical expenses although the law has sought only to compensate him. This unnecessary enrichment of the injured party would be
prevented and the burden of the loss properly placed upon the negligent
party if the collateral source was allowed to prosecute his contractual right
of subrogation. Where, as in the principal case, the court denies a right
of subrogation, the total cost of compensating for negligent acts is unnecessarily increased by the profits received by injured parties; this undesirable
result is reached by the dogmatic adherence to a common law rule of nontransferability where the reason for the rule has been abrogated by a survival statute.to
On the other hand, when a medical insurer has not obtained a contractual right of subrogation, it becomes a primary obligor and is liable for
the medical expenses of the insured injured party without regard to the
manner in which the expenses were incurred. Most courts deny such an
insurer a subrogated cause of action in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of the insurer through the nonpayment of its primary obligation.11
Consequently, the total cost of compensating for negligent acts is increased
by emphasizing the possible unjust enrichment of the insurer rather than
the unnecessary profit of the injured party.
The proper solution of these problems which arise in compensating for
personal injuries does not lie in discouraging payments from collateral
sources by denying them a right of reimbursement. Such payments are highly
useful in shifting the cost of carrying the wrongdoer's obligation from the
7 Cf. Black v. Chicago&: G.W. R.R., 187 Iowa 904, 174 N.W. 774 (1919).
8 The overwhelming majority of states would not reduce the damages recoverable by
the amount of the medical expenses paid by an outside source. See McCORMICK, DAMAGES
§ 90 (1935). For collected cases, see Annot., 95 A.L.R. 575 (1935); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d
355 (1950)h
o See McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 90 (1935).
10 The California survival statute provides an interesting paradox. Although it
removes the reason for barring assignment, it prohibits the assignment of personal injury
claims. CAL. CIV. ConE § 956.
11 Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 373, 63 N.W.2d 638, 641 (1954).
However, where the policy contains a subrogation clause there would be no unjust enrichment. Michigan Medical Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 577, 64 N.W.2d 713,714 (1954).
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injured party to the collateral source during the time lag between accident
and recovery. Indeed, if the collateral source is allowed to turn to the
wrongdoer to recover the medical expenses which it has incurred on behalf
of the injured party, it would be encouraged to make funds available for
the timely payment of medical bills at a lower cost to the insured. These
considerations seem more meaningful than any technical reason for denying
the plaintiff a right to be subrogated to that part of the injured party's
cause of action which represents the cost of medical treatment.1 2
Only partial subrogation of a cause of action will, however, bring into
play many of the procedural difficulties associated with splitting a cause of
action. If the action brought in the subrogee's name proceeded to judgment, the injured party would be prevented by the principles of res judicata
from prosecuting a subsequent action to recover for his remaining injuries.13
If the injured party were allowed a second action, the defendant would
be required to defend the same cause of action twice. These considerations
should preclude the subrogee from bringing an action in his own name, but
they do not require that he be denied a substantive right to recover for
medical expense payments. In common law states, the procedural difficulties
associated with splitting a cause of action may be avoided when the action
is brought in the name of, or by, the injured party for the benefit of the
subrogee who would share in the proceeds to the extent of the medical
expenses it has paid.14 In this case it would seem proper for the court to
apportion the judgment between the injured party and the subrogee. In
jurisdictions which require the action to be brought in the name of the
real party in interest, the injured party and the subrogee should be required to join as co-plaintiffs, each recovering a judgment reflecting his
interest in the cause of action. Both the injured party and the subrogee
should be treated as indispensable parties to prevent the possibility of a
second suit on the same cause of action.15
In the principal case, the court could have properly dismissed the action,
because the plaintiff did not, under a real party in interest statute,16 join
the resident's estate.17 Nevertheless, the court proceeded to construe an
anti-assignment statute so broadly as to deny a substantive right to partial
subrogation by contract; the court did not appear to consider the reasons
which seem to compel the opposite result. The foregoing considerations
should demonstrate the need for corrective action to facilitate payment and
reduce the cost of compensating personal injuries.
Jerome M. Salle
12 These considerations have been given effect in the area of workmen's compensation.
See CAL. I.An. CoDE § 3852.
13 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 155 Cal. App. 2d 861 (1957); City of New
York v. Barbato, 5 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Manhattan Munic. Ct. 1938) (dictum).
14 BLUIIIE, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7-03 (1955).
15 United States v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., supra note 2; BLUME, op. cit. supra note
14, § 7-03. Cf. 51 MICH. L. REv. 587 (1952).
16 CAL. CIV. PROC. CoDE § 367.
17 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 389.

